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Abstract(
Software)and)systems)complexity)can)have)a)profound)impact)on)information)security.)Such)
complexity)is)not)only)imposed)by)the)imperative)technical)challenges)of)monitored)
heterogeneous)and)dynamic)(IP)and)VLAN)assignments))network)infrastructures,)but)also)
through)the)advances)in)exploits)and)malware)distribution)mechanisms)driven)by)the)
underground)economics.))In)addition,)operational)business)constraints)(disruptions)and)
consequences,)manpower,)and)endEuser)satisfaction),)increase)the)complexity)of)the)problem)
domain)that)security)analysts)must)adequately)operate)within.)This)is)particularly)evident)
when)implementing)effective)response)measures)to)malware)infections)in)a)timely)manner,)
minimizing)the)risk)to)business.)A)simple)question)becomes)particularly)valid)under)such)
complex)environments;)what)appropriate)response)actions)must)be)met)to)appropriately)
eradicate)malware)infections)while)maintaining)high)operational)and)low)risk)profile?)This)
need)stems)from)the)absence)of)predefined)and)preEcorrelated)knowledge)of)the)environment)
and)malware)behaviors.)Without)such)knowledge,)isolating,)analyzing,)and)responding)to)
incidents)at)the)very)same)time)of)the)infection)become)increasingly)difficult.)Specially,)when)
the)incident)involves)aggressive)malware)specimens)exhibiting)behaviors)such)as)network)
propagation,)acting)as)a)spambot,)or)seeking)data)exfiltration.)In)this)case,)it)is)critical)to)
respond)to)the)incident)before)serious)consequences)to)the)business)occur.)
The)faster)the)compromise)is)detected)and)responded)to,)the)more)it)will)be)controlled)and)the)
less)impact)it)will)have.)For)this)purpose,)a)methodological)framework)to)respond)to)malware)
incidents)is)proposed.)At)its)core,)the)framework)focuses)on)minimizing)the)DetectionEToE
Response)(DTR))process)and)time)frames.)The)foundations)upon)which)the)framework)is)built)
consist)of)preEcorrelated)contextual)knowledge)about)the)monitored)network,)and)a)preEbuilt)
malware)analysis)knowledgebase.)This)allows)the)framework)to)systematically)and)
dynamically)automate)network)actions)to)isolate)infected)hosts)as)early)as)detection.)At)the)
same)time,)the)collected)multidimensional)knowledge)is)presented)to)the)analyst)to)aid)during)
the)investigation)and)response)phases.)Ultimately,)the)early)automation)of)response)actions,)
and)reduced)response)time)frames)preserve)the)continuity)of)operations,)as)well)as)endEusers)
relationship)fidelity.))To)demonstrate)the)efficacy)of)such)framework,)two)case)studies)are)
presented)to)help)evaluate)the)proposed)framework)in)responding)to)malware)incidents.!An Early Malware Detection, Correlation, and Incident Response System with Case Studies! 2 
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1. Complexity and Information Security 
“The complexity of software is an essential property, not an accidental one” 
(Brooks, 1987). The adopted software architecture and coding paradigms directly affect 
software internal and external quality attributes, specifically complexity (Mansour & 
Mustafa, 2011). However, complexity is not a desired system attribute. As (Schneier, 
2000) notes, “The future of digital systems is complexity, and complexity is the worst 
enemy of security”. Complexity in this paper not only refers to the inherent complexity of 
software and the interactions among discrete systems (Booch, 1994), but also delves into 
the technical and operational challenges imposed by the monitored network infrastructure 
and business constraints. The former challenges include the heterogeneous and dynamic 
nature of a network infrastructure. The latter challenges involve the consequences on 
business due to malware (in this context, malware refers to any type of malicious code 
designed to damage or otherwise perform unintended actions on behalf of a computer 
system user, such as Trojans, worms, viruses, backdoors, etc.) infections, lack of 
manpower and expertise to respond to infected hosts and the end-user perspective. Both 
types of challenges require the analyst to adequately operate while maintaining credible 
incident analysis and response. Finally, the ability to technically respond to malware 
infections before they severely impact business operations is a key. 
Heterogeneous environments necessitate the deployment and support of various 
operating systems (OS’s) as business requires. This expands the problem domain for the 
analyst as different OS’s will be prone to different types of vulnerabilities and may be 
targeted with different malware infections. Hence, requiring different response 
techniques. Dynamic and role-based IP address and VLAN assignments raise the level of 
complexity for the analyst. An infected host must be accurately identified, tracked, and 
isolated if necessary within appropriate time frames prior to changes caused by the 
dynamic infrastructure. 
Without predetermined and readily available knowledge about the environment 
and infections behaviors and mitigations, it becomes increasingly difficult for the analyst 
to properly respond to infected hosts in a timely manner. In addition, the absence of An Early Malware Detection, Correlation, and Incident Response System with Case Studies! 3 
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automated response actions can be overwhelming, especially when dealing with multiple 
incidents at once. This is particularly evident if a host is infected with offensive malware 
exhibiting behaviors such as data exfiltration or attacking the internal network. Other 
examples include network worms such as Dorkbot (possibly propagating to other hosts) 
and Steckt/Neeris IRCbots, or ransomware infections such as Uruasy. In general, these 
types of infections not only prevent employees from performing business functions, but 
also can leave a negative impact if not responded to in a timely fashion. Dorkbot and 
Steckt/Neeris worms are presented as case studies in this paper (see Section 3).  
An emergent need stems from the absence of actionable data which allows for a 
timely-fashioned, and informed decision making regarding malware compromises. If 
such data exists, response actions can be dynamically determined and automated on the 
fly at the very same time when a malware infection strikes. Hence, avoiding the 
organization the consequences preceding the incident. The work presented in this paper 
attempts to assess the proposed custom framework to fulfil this emergent need. Another 
aspect of the framework that is equally important is the ability to instantly present the 
analyst with the pre-correlated and multidimensional knowledge regarding the malware 
incident. This knowledge then serves as the initial response and investigation strategy. 
1.1.  Malware, an Added Layer of Complexity and its Importance 
Historically, malware existed since the 1980’s when Fred Cohen demonstrated the 
ability to use malicious code to attack computers (Stamp, 2011). Unfortunately, over time 
and due to several factors, the perception of malware infections is not necessarily 
regarded as a serious risk (Ross, 2010). One of these factors that is of interest to this 
paper is the naming conventions used to identify malware. For example, “The quirky 
names given to viruses…exacerbate this tendency to trivialize an infected host as 
nuisance rather than a true security threat.” (Ross, 2010). One might assume since 
malware naming convention standards such as the Computer Antivirus Research 
Organization (CARO)
1 and the Common Malware Enumeration (CME)
2 Initiative exist, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1!An!example!of!how!CARO!assigns!names!to!malware!is!available!at:!
http://www.microsoft.com/security/portal/mmpc/shared/malwarenaming.aspx!
2!CME!is!no!longer!active!and!all!of!its!efforts!have!been!transferred!to!the!Malware!Attribute!
Enumeration!and!Characterization!(MAEC):!http://maec.mitre.org/!An Early Malware Detection, Correlation, and Incident Response System with Case Studies! 4 
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it may be relatively easy to name and identify malware. However, in reality, it is still a 
difficult task to assign malware names in a consistent manner (Zeltser, 2011). As a result, 
this may become a major confusion to the analyst. Mainly, because of the uncertainty of 
whether existing detection signatures and tools cover the encountered malware.  
An added layer of complexity for the analyst comes bundled with the advances in 
tactics and dynamics in which malware is distributed, operated, and the motivations 
behind it. For instance, the Kaspersky report (Kaspersky, 2013) reveals that the number 
of phishing attacks has almost doubled; registering an 87% increase from last year. Not 
only has the number of attacks increased, but also the organization of attackers. For 
example, targeted phishing attacks by selectively gathering intelligence about targets to 
craft specific phishing scams (Schneier, 2013) have been observed. This can be relatively 
easy using automated social engineering tools described in (Kennedy, 2013).  
In (Batchelder et al., 2013) report, malicious or compromised websites topped the 
list of threats that enterprises encounter, leading to the distribution of malware as a result. 
An example of such a technique to distribute malware is typically done by compromising 
a site which hosts content that is of common interest to a domain or group of people. 
Once compromised, the site’s HTML code is injected with malicious JavaScript possibly 
exploiting vulnerabilities on users’ machines browsing the compromised site. This type 
of attack is known as “Waterholing” or “Watering hole”. Specifically, this attack was 
used to plant malicious JavaScript on a popular developer forum to exploit unpatched 
Java (Romang, 2013) which eventually ended up compromising hosts at Microsoft 
(Thomlinson, 2013), Facebook, and Apple (Mimoso, 2013). A similar attack against the 
official PHP site that involved appending obfuscated JavaScript that redirected the 
visiting users to malicious sites to download malware (Kimberly, 2013). A high level 
diagram of the drive-by payload is depicted in Figure 1. Through a relatively similar type 
of attack utilizing a 0-day vulnerability – CVE-2013-3906 – (Li, 2013), a variant 
backdoor malware was distributed through embedding the exploit code into a site “known 
to draw visitors that are likely interested in national and international security policy” 
(Moran, Vashisht, Scott & Haq , 2013). An Early Malware Detection, Correlation, and Incident Response System with Case Studies! 5 
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Malware is a prevalent problem that can have serious consequences on 
businesses. In fact, the (Verizon, 2013) report stresses that malware ranks in the top 
threats facing organizations, registering 40% of the number of breaches. This is driven by 
the underground economics behind exploits and malware distribution, which add more 
sophistication to the attacks nature.  (Grier et al., 2012) discusses the model of “Exploit-
as-a-service”. Simply, the model describes how attackers that monetize from 
compromised hosts may be independent from attackers that exploit the same hosts (i.e.: 
affiliate programs). Their study showed that 32 families of the most prominent malware 
are distributed through exploit kits and drive-by downloads. In addition, malware 
automation tools discussed in (Elisan, 2013) allow automated creation and updating of 
polymorphic malware specimens with encryption and anti-debugging capabilities to 
evade detection. This, combined with the commercialization and automation of exploit 
kits (Kirk, 2013) chaining exploits to guarantee penetration, and possibly dropping 
malware payloads increase the complexity of incident detection, tracking, and response. 
 
Figure 1. A high-level diagram of the PHP.net compromise (drive-by). An Early Malware Detection, Correlation, and Incident Response System with Case Studies! 6 
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1.2.  Towards Defensive and Self-Healing Networks 
The work done in (Gu et al., 2007), emphasizes a malware dialog-based 
correlation technique to gather and correlate the stages of the malware (bots) infection 
process. The proposed model provides a comprehensive report of the related events of the 
infection which can be useful for the analyst during incident response. Also, defensive 
(Johnson, 2013) and decoy (Tangwongsan & Pangphuthipong, 2007) network systems 
can capture a wealth of attack information, not only through actions generated by an 
attacker, but also can be utilized to capture information about automated malware 
behaviors, such as a malware mapping the internal network for potential targets. A recent 
project (Automated Cyber Reasoning) was initiated by DARPA (DARPA, 2013) in the 
form of a cyber-challenge with autonomous defense systems as its theme. Through 
software reasoning and utilizing signature-based systems such as IDSs, the goal is to 
implement resilient and autonomous integrated systems capable of automatically 
gathering and validating information about software vulnerabilities and patches, as well 
as discovering and mitigating security flaws. This is a particularly important project 
which may lead to advances in the field of self-healing networks. 
In a relatively similar fashion, when a malware infection is detected, it must be 
contained and responded to as early as the detection takes place. Such an infection may 
be internal due to misconfigurations or user unawareness, or through an external 
(unmanaged) host connecting to the corporate network. This allows conducting the 
investigation and eradication phases in an isolated environment, without affecting 
production systems. In order to achieve this, response actions must be dynamically 
determined and automated based on the pre-correlated contextual knowledge. 
2. Automated Correlation, Detection, and Response  
2.1.  Breaking Down the Problem Domain 
Approaching a complex problem domain necessitates dissecting it into smaller 
manageable sub-domains and addressing these in relation to each other. The work 
presented in this paper is driven by the challenges discussed in the introduction and 
which are detailed in this section.  An Early Malware Detection, Correlation, and Incident Response System with Case Studies! 7 
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Challenge 1: Alert-to-Host-to-User (AHU) identification 
Description: In a dynamic environment, IP-to-host assignments largely depend on 
a number of factors such as the DHCP server(s) and DHCP leases, port changes and host 
restarts, to name a few. It is significant to be able to identify a host and its owner as soon 
as the malware infection occurs. This allows the ability to track and directly approach the 
infected machine for remediation. Dissecting the various types of logs generated by 
different types of network appliances can also be challenging. Even though the logs are 
related, unfortunately, the relation among them are not directly inferred or easily tracked, 
especially in a dynamic environment. For example, hunting down an IP address that 
triggered a malware alert on the IDS may not be trivial and even may be time consuming. 
The analyst then needs to determine the effects and consequences of the malware, 
increasing the time to respond to the incident. Other limiting factors may also include 
separations of duties, where an analyst may need to access certain appliance logs but by 
virtue of the job duties and ownership, the access may be not feasible.   
Challenge 2: Prioritizing malware infection incidents 
Description: One of the major tasks the security analyst performs is to prioritize 
events generated by the IDS. The same should also apply to malware infections. This is 
driven by facts that not all malware specimens are the same nor they behave in the same 
manner. Most importantly, the impact imposed by different malware types may require 
certain response time frames and procedures. Such prioritization should also be inherited 
by the actions performed during the response. For instance, CryptoLocker malware may 
be downloaded within twenty-four hours after the initial infection (Baykal, 2013). Since 
Cryptolocker can lead to data and productivity loss, instance response driven by the 
contextual knowledge can have a vital role in crippling the malware from downloading 
the encryption keys, hence failing to encrypt files on the system.  
Challenge 3: Determining initial response upon which further analysis is carried 
Description: In tandem with Challenge 2, prioritizing infection incidents can help 
the analyst make informed response decisions. Essentially, the existence of predefined 
and instant knowledge about the malware and its behaviors can greatly improve the 
response process. For example, a malware capable of propagating through the network to An Early Malware Detection, Correlation, and Incident Response System with Case Studies! 8 
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critical business servers (ex.: file sharing serves) may warrant disabling access to the 
server(s). This also includes actionable knowledge such as the interactions with the host 
operating system such as executable directory, registry entries, persistence methods, and 
so forth. The knowledge also contains steps and tools that can be used for disinfection. 
Having this information in hand at the time of infection not only helps the analyst quickly 
and specifically address the infection, but also reduces the risk of the malware damages, 
as well as the negative productivity impact on end users. 
Challenge 4: Isolating host(s) infected with serious malware 
Description: Certain malware specimens may exhibit behaviors that can impact 
business continuity and assets. Such types of malware require immediate containment 
before further consequences occur. Considering Cryptolocker example again, the ability 
to dynamically isolate the infected host as soon as an alert is generated to an isolated 
network segment with no internet access may prevent CryptoLocker from contacting its 
Command and Control (C&C) servers, thus preventing the malware from obtaining the 
encryption keys. Consider also hosts acting as spambots due to infections with malware 
such as kelihos. If not contained appropriately, it may lead to IP blacklisting of the 
affected organization due to the mass sending of spam emails from the infected hosts. 
Other damaging malware examples include password-stealing and exfiltration malware 
such Zeus/Zbot (MMPC, 2013) and Vawtrak (MMPC, 2013), as well as backdoor 
malware (RAT) allowing an attacker to control the infected host, possibly initiating a 
DDOS from a wide range of infected hosts. Instantly and dynamically isolating such 
infections is crucial to business continuity due the damages imposed by the malware.   
Challenge 5: Bridging the gaps between helpdesk teams and security teams 
Description: In general, helpdesk teams are considered the frontline when it 
comes to end-users reporting technical complaints. Such issues may be caused by a 
malware infection preventing an end user from performing business functions. In this 
case, the helpdesk team may need to be armed with basic response skills to aid the 
security team in combatting malware, and at the same time, respond to end-users 
inquiries. This need is particularly evident when a malware infection outbreak is in place. 
Achieving a seamless response skills sharing without overloading helpdesk teams is An Early Malware Detection, Correlation, and Incident Response System with Case Studies! 9 
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important. The existence of pre-correlated knowledgebase can facilitate skills sharing. In 
other words, the helpdesk team will not have to spend the time and efforts hunting down 
the infected machine and then research eradication techniques. Instead, the knowledge to 
fix the problem is already shared. Similarly, the security team can allocate the time saved 
into analyzing other incidents or continue building and improving the knowledgebase.  
Challenge 6: Minimizing the impact on business continuity and end-users  
Description: Malware incidents can prove to be disruptive to business operations. 
The time taken to analyze the incident, determine appropriate response and containment 
actions, and eventually recover operations to its fully operational state can be costly. This 
effect also extends to individual end users. Malware infections can be frustrating, 
especially for none tech-savvy employees when infections prevent them from operating 
routinely. The ultimate goal of early detection and response is to minimize such 
disruptions for both, the business and end-users alike.  
2.2.  Making Use of Existing Log Data 
Almost every device (managed or unmanaged) connected to the network is either 
configured to or automatically generates some form of logs. Network activities registered 
by network appliances are logged regardless of connection type (wired, wireless, or VPN) 
and regardless of authentication mechanism (machine or user authentication). Also logs 
such as firewall logs, Network Access Control (NAC) logs, and IDS alerts all provide 
valuable information to the monitoring and response processes. Other logs that may not 
be automatically generated but has added value include ARP and NAT tables. There may 
also be internally maintained logs such a malware knowledgebase that can be used to 
provide additional information to the initial detection and assessment. 
Not all information recorded in the logs may be useful or necessary for a certain 
task. In this case the logs may be parsed and pruned appropriately to extract the useful 
information. For example a malware alert gets generated on the IDS. The alert is then 
parsed to correlate it to a certain malware knowledge base record, then the offending IP 
address is queried and validated against the stored NAC log record and through querying 
the switch ARP tables. Another example may involve a host behind a proxy or a NATed 
IP address. In this case the NAT table needs to be queried to obtain the host’s IP address An Early Malware Detection, Correlation, and Incident Response System with Case Studies! 10 
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and then validate that IP address against the NAC logs store. VPN logs and session 
durations also play a major role in identifying infected hosts generating malware alerts.  
Once all of the information extracted from the logs is pre-correlated and 
assembled in a readable manner, it becomes easy to correlate an infected host generating 
alerts on the IDS, its owner and possibly the affected OS. Eventually this leads to 
informed decision making on how to proceed with the incident. Other malware alerts may 
need immediate action such isolating the infected host. With the information already 
correlated and stored, automatic network actions can be initiated to isolate the infected 
host preventing further network activities from that particular host. At the same time, the 
security team is notified of the action. Combined with the preexisting malware 
knowledge, responding to the incident can be quick. 
2.3.  Researching Malware for Behavior and Mitigations 
Researching malware in the context of this paper focuses on building the 
knowledge for identifying 1) malware network and C&C behaviors, 2) malware 
interactions with the host and the Indicators of Compromise (IoC), and 3) eradication and 
disinfection methods and tools. Such knowledge is mainly accumulated by performing 
two major tasks in order to research and obtain knowledge about malware. The first task 
involves utilizing online resources specializing in malware analysis. Several online 
resources provide a wealth of analysis data about malware families such as VirusTotal, 
Malwr, TotalHash, Microsoft Malware Encyclopedia, and malware analysis blogs.  
The second task involves dynamic malware analysis in a testing environment 
when possible or necessary. Through this phase, the analyst will be able to uncover and 
dismantle the various external and internal network activities generated by the malware. 
These may be DNS queries for domains requested by the malware, anomalous HTTP 
requests and User-Agents, or even port scans against the internal network. Another added 
advantage is the ability to identify variant behaviors of existing malware, such as new 
C&C domains and communication patterns. Thus, allowing the analyst to unleash the 
information required to craft custom signatures or update existing ones. Later, these will 
be integrated with the existing IDS infrastructure to detect suspected network activities. 
In addition to capturing network traffic, the analyst will also be able to record the An Early Malware Detection, Correlation, and Incident Response System with Case Studies! 11 
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interactions between the malware and host, such as file system and registry changes. This 
helps the analyst to reveal patterns of interactions which can be converted into IoCs that 
help in responding to and the reporting of malware incidents. Simulating real life 
infections can also serve as practical tests for malware eradication techniques and tools. 
All of the experienced knowledge collected during malware research and analysis 
provides an in-depth understanding of malware behaviors. This provides a solid ground 
upon which the analyst can devise incident response plans to combat malware infections. 
Eventually, the knowledge is presented in a consistent and formatted manner that is easily 
consumed to support the response process in future malware infection incidents. 
2.4.  System Components and Workflow 
The proposed framework consists of four key components; Logging and 
Correlation, Detection, Response, and Reporting. Each area is comprised of one or more 
modules, each of which is responsible for a certain functionality and cohesively operating 
to achieve the desired behavior. A high level architectural diagram is illustrated in Figure 
2. 
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Figure 2.  Components of the automated Correlation, Detection, and Response Framework. 
2.4.1.  Logging and Correlation Component 
This component consists of two modules; 1) Log Parser and Correlator, and 2) 
Malware Knowledgebase. The Log Parser and Correlator is responsible for receiving the An Early Malware Detection, Correlation, and Incident Response System with Case Studies! 12 
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various log messages from different types of appliances. Logs like NAC authentications 
for clients connecting and authenticating to the network through the wire, wireless, and 
VPN. For each log type, a log parser is written to extract the fields of concern such as the 
user authenticating to the network, IP address, MAC address, switch, and the switch port 
the user was authenticated on. Each parser will extract the appropriate fields of the 
associated log type to create structured data stores for correlation in a later step. This 
way, any machine that comes onto the network, or re-authenticates, its associated logs get 
stored in the data store. Further processing takes place by querying the switch on which a 
machine is authenticated on-demand to pull the ARP tables. This is necessary for three 
major reasons; 1) verify that the stored log record for a machine matches the entry in the 
ARP table, 2) track the ARP changes for a particular machine, and 3) correlate the 
machine which authenticated through the wire to its physical wall jack port, the wire 
label connecting the machine, and eventually the room number in which the machine 
exists. At this point, the owner of the machine and its physical location is determined and 
stored. All of the above takes place on a scheduled manner even if there are no IDS alerts 
relating to a machine. Other logs are also pulled on demand, mainly when an alert is 
triggered. Such logs include NAT tables for machines behind a NAT device or a proxy. 
This is required to correlate the private IP address with the authenticated machine, instead 
of taking action based on the NAT public IP address. 
The Malware Knowledgebase module is basically a data store for information 
about malware. Using the methods identified in Section 2.3, information such a summary 
description of the malware and its capabilities, client IoC’s, malware names by different 
vendors, the tools for disinfection and the order in which they should be run is stored. 
Currently, the knowledgebase is manually and continuously maintained by the security 
team. The identification of malware names against the tools used provides a confidence 
level that the used tool is actually detecting the encountered malware. Another purpose 
for this scheme is that if other malicious programs are detected, they are distinguished. 
Part of researching malware is to assign a custom defined severity/action level and a 
threshold for each identified malware knowledgebase record. The severity/action level 
and the threshold are used in the response module. In general, the severity level defines 
the automated action required by this level. While the threshold defines the acceptable An Early Malware Detection, Correlation, and Incident Response System with Case Studies! 13 
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time period within which, a human action is required for disinfection. Once all of the 
information of a given malware is defined, it is correlated to a signature ID for the 
detection component. Eventually, this knowledge base will serve as an initial response 
plan and a guide for security and helpdesk teams. 
2.4.2.  Detection Component 
The Detection module consists mainly of the IDS generating an alert when a 
malware network traffic is detected. The generated alert is forwarded to the Alerts Parser 
to extract the signature ID, the offending IP address and port. This information is then 
processed by the Response component. 
2.4.3.  Response Component and Workflow 
With the contextual intelligence about the environment, hosts, and malware 
knowledge are prebuilt, the MAL Correlation and Decision Engine module is ready to be 
invoked. A high level workflow of how the MAL Engine operates is depicted in Figure 3.  
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Figure 3. High level Framework workflow. 
The MAL Engine is triggered when an alert is generated by the IDS. After the 
alert information is parsed, the Engine correlates the signature ID with the record 
predetermined in the malware knowledgebase. At the same time, the Engine identifies the 
source network (wired, wireless, or NAT, etc.) from the alert IP address to query the 
appropriate data store and then correlates it with the predetermined record of the 
associated host. Based on the predefined severity/action level, the MAL Engine informs 
the Actions Engine of the response required to act upon. The Actions Engine then 
performs the actual response by either 1) only notifying the security and helpdesk teams 
for human interaction, 2) forcing the switch port to fail authentication to a quarantine 
VLAN with a captive portal to inform the end-user of the action, and then notify the 
security and helpdesk teams of the action, and 3) shutting down the switch port promptly An Early Malware Detection, Correlation, and Incident Response System with Case Studies! 14 
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inhibiting any further network activities. The last two actions are also accompanied with 
notifications. 
2.4.4.  Output and Reporting 
This is the final component and destination of all of the data and resulting actions 
generated by the Detection, Correlation, and Response components. The information 
stored provides input for the incident response reporting, as well as, historical pivoting 
into previous malware incidents. It serves as a store for lessons learned where each 
experienced incident is updated with more data as observed in the field. To facilitate the 
access to all data stores and knowledge, a custom graphical interface was developed to 
allow members of the security and helpdesk teams search through and update the 
information. 
3. Case Studies 
3.1.  Dorkbot Variant Worm 
3.1.1.  Initial Threat Vector 
Unfortunately, patient zero was not accurately identified. This may be due to the 
fact that patient zero may have been infected outside the enterprise network, or simply 
due to non-existence of detection signatures for this particular variant of Dorkbot. 
However, examining an identified infected host revealed that an unsolicited Skype 
message containing two links to suspicious files hosted on MediaFire cloud storage 
service.  
 
By the time of examining the suspicious links, the files were already removed. A 
current search for the pattern of the URI and files names reveals more recent results on 
VirusTotal resembling the patterns examined. 
3.1.2.  Client-to-Server (CTS) and Server-to-Client (STC) Infections 
Client-to-Server (CTS) infection is referred to when a Windows client infected 
with the Dorkbot variant connects to a Windows file server (shared network drive), An Early Malware Detection, Correlation, and Incident Response System with Case Studies! 15 
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leading to propagate the malware to the server . While Server-to-Client (STC) infection is 
referred to when a clean Windows client – uninfected with Dorkbot – connects to a 
shared network drive previously visited by an infected client, hence propagating the 
malware from the server to the client; both infection types are depicted in Figure 4. The 
distinction between both scenarios is explicitly illustrated, mainly for two reasons: 1) the 
server acts as an incubator for the malware executable to infect clean clients connecting 
to it. Hence, all infections propagating from an infected client to a previously unaffected 
shared network drive follow the same pattern and the naming conventions, 2) the 
malware executable on the server is idle and does not run on the server itself, i.e., it does 
not have any processes spawned nor it performs any type of C&C. 
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Create&Request&File
Create&Request&File
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Create&Request&File
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Figure 4. Client-to-Server (CTS) & Server-to-Client (STC) infections over NetBIOS SMB UDP 
445 (Typical SMB conversation flow – Negotiation, Session Setup, TreeConnect – is omitted). 
In a CTS infection, when a Dorkbot infected client (192.168.106.133) connects to 
the server; through SMB over TCP port 445, the malware on the client creates a folder 
named “snkb0ptz” on the root directory of the browsed shared drive, Figure 4 ( ).  
 
Once the folder is created, the malware starts copying its files – “desktop.ini” and 
“snkb0ptz.exe” – which will be hosted on the server into that folder, Figure 4 (    ).  
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Another file, “autorun.ini” is dropped, Figure 4 ( ) at the root directory of the 
browsed folder. The malware then enumerates all folders and manipulates their attributes, 
Figure 4 (    ) through the SetInfo FILE_BAIC_INFO structure (MS Dev, 2013). The 
manipulation of the attributes is discussed at the end of this page.  
 
 
 
Finally, for each enumerated folder, the malware creates the respective shortcuts – 
“.lnk” – using the original file names, Figure 4 ( ). These are discussed later.  
 
Examining the infected server reveals the results of the actions observed during 
the capture while the malware is infecting the server. Listing the directories with 
attributes marked as Read-Only, Hidden, and System, exposes the manipulated attributes 
of the infected shared folders, “share” and “share1”, as depicted in Figure 5. 
Infected(
shared
folders
“snkb0ptz”(
folder
“autorun.inf”
“snkb0ptz”(
folder(
contents  
Figure 5. Infected shared folders attributes and the "snkb0ptz" folder. An Early Malware Detection, Correlation, and Incident Response System with Case Studies! 17 
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Further examination of the contents of the infected shared folder “share1”, shows 
the hidden original files and the respective shortcuts created by Dorkbot. Mainly, these 
are created to deceive end users on the changes made by the malware, and at the same 
time, force end users to execute the malware into their hosts once access is attempted. 
This is evident when examining the Target value of the shortcut which points to the 
malware executable file within “snkb0ptz\snkb0ptz.exe” as shown in Figure 6.   
 
Figure'6.!Shortcut!Target!value!points!to!the!malware!executable.(
At this point, the server is hosting the malware, and all of the created shortcuts 
corresponding to the original folders point to the same malware executable. When a new 
client connects to the server and attempts to access (double-click) a shortcut, the malware 
executes and propagates itself into the client host through SMB over TCP port 445. The 
infection process in STC starts with the client (192.168.5.132) requesting to find – 
FILE_ID_BOTH_DIR_INFO structure (MS Dev, 2013) – and read the “snkb0ptz” folder 
and its contents, Figure 4 (    ).  
 
 
Since the file exits on the server, the infection process proceeds with requests to 
read/write the malware executable stream, Figure 4 ( ) – FILE_STREM_INFO – (MS 
Dev, 2013).  
 An Early Malware Detection, Correlation, and Incident Response System with Case Studies! 18 
!
Yaser!Mansour,!ymansour@outlook.com! ! !
 
The infection then continues by writing the “desktop.ini” and “autorun.inf” files 
back to client, Figure 4 ( ,  ,  ).  
 
 
Finally, a notification response is sent from the server to the client that there are 
no more files to read, Figure 4 ( ) through the SMB error message 
STATUS_NO_MORE_FILES (MS-SMB, 2013).  
 
Once all of the malware files are transferred to the client, the executable 
“snkp0ptz.exe” spawns and executes another process with a name following the regular 
expression of [A-Z]{1}[a-z]{15}.exe or [a-z]{15}.exe. This executable is then stored on 
the local disk of the infected client at “%AppData%\Local\Temp\” or 
“%AppData%\Roaming\”. This newly copied binary is responsible for all of the 
Command and Control Communications (C&C) on the client. 
Throughout the process of analyzing the CTS and STC infections, several 
behaviors were observed. First, the CTS infection is consistent in terms of the malware 
execution actions, the malware folder/file names and locations, as well as the size of the 
malicious files. Second, when CTS infection is in action against an already infected 
shared folder/drive, the malware on the client still executes, however, all requests made 
to the server fail. Finally, if the request to create the malware folder “snkb0ptz” is 
interrupted/prevented, the remaining requests will fail and the malware will not be 
transferred to the server. Odd behaviors were also observed. In a STC scenario, the client 
issued a SMB create request for the file “SwDRM.dll” located within the malware 
“snkb0ptz” folder. However, neither the path “snkb0ptz\ui\” nor the file “SwDRM.dll” 
existed. This is evident in the server’s response to the initial request made by the client. 
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3.1.3.  Command and Control Communication (C&C) 
Once a client is infected with the Dorkbot variant, the malware starts its C&C 
communication. Seventeen unique domains were requested through DNS. A list of the 
domains queried by the malware, together with the protocol(s) and port(s) used for 
communication, after the DNS queries, are summarized in Table 1 (Symbol d# is used for 
shortness and does not reflect order). 
Sym.  Domain  Protocol  Port 
d1  s117.hotfile.com  TCP/HTTP  80 
d2  s133.hotfile.com  TCP/HTTP  80 
d3  s431.hotfile.com  TCP/HTTP  80 
d4  s624.hotfile.com  TCP/HTTP  80 
d5  f.eastmoon.pl  TCP/IRC  9000 
d6  xixbh.net  TCP/IRC  9000 
d7  f.dailyradio.su  TCP/HTTP  80 
d8  supp.cantvenlinea.biz  TCP/HTTP  1942 
d9  xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx.kei.su  TCP/HTTP  1942 
d10  s.richlab.pl  Server Failure  - 
d11  photobeat.su, h.opennews.su, o.dailyradio.su, xixbh.com, gigasbh.org, 
uranus.kei.su, gigasphere.su 
DNS blocked  - 
'
Table 1. Summary of Dorkbot variant domains, protocols, and ports observed during C&C.(
!
Each queried domain or domain set has a certain purpose within the malware 
execution lifecycle. In summary, three major purposes were observed, namely 1) further 
download malicious binaries, 2) join IRC channels, and 3) posting Bitcoin mining jobs. 
The actions are summarized in Figure 7 and will be discussed later in this section. 
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Starting with queries to d1, d2, d3, and d4, which are used to resolve four 
different URL’s, each of which leading to the download of a different binary to the 
requesting client. According to Microsoft Protection Center, these are detected as Worm: 
Win32/Dorkbot.AT, Worm: Win32/Dorpiex.A, Trojan: Win32/Vicenor, and VirTool: 
Win32/CeeInject.gen!JH respectively. 
 
After the successful response to d5 and d6 DNS queries, a TCP connection is 
established over port 9000. Upon close examination of the traffic, the session was 
established as an attempt to engage the infected host in IRC communication. Specifically, 
joining the infected host to two different channels; “#sp yap” and “#xix”, however, only 
the former channel was successfully joined, Figure 8, (  . Before joining the “#sp yap” 
channel, the infected host was assigned a nick and a user with user-mode of “+iwG”. 
According to (Kalt (A), 2000), the “+iw” makes (+) the user – the infected host – 
invisible (i); no other users can see the joined user, and the (w) turns on WALLOPS 
messages; which allows a message to be sent to all connected users. The (G) user mode 
character is not defined in the RFC and may be implementation-dependent. It may be 
used to add censorship to messages by stripping out bad words.  
One of the major purposes observed for joining the infected host to an IRC 
channel is to have the host report its infection status through an IRC private message. 
 
The packet illustrated in the capture above was sent when a USB thumb drive was 
connected to the infected host. By the time of writing this paper, the channel “#sp yap” is 
sinkholed by CERT Polska. Figure 8, (   illustrates the IRC channel sinkhole. An Early Malware Detection, Correlation, and Incident Response System with Case Studies! 21 
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Figure 8. Infected host attempt to join #sp yap and #xix IRC channels  . The IRC channel #sp yap 
sinkholed by CERT Polska  . 
A download of what appears to be an image file of a PNG extension followed the 
DNS query to d7. However, the image does not follow the Portable Network Graphics 
(PNG) Specification (Boutell, 1997) and (Adler et al., 2003). Specifically, the PNG 
Signature and the IHDR (first chunk) and the IEND chunks in the downloaded image 
does not conform to those defined in the standards. The top capture represents the Hex 
values of the PNG signature and IHDR chunk of the downloaded image compared to the 
same of a valid PNG image. 
 
Several HTTP GET requests were made to download the PNG file from the same 
domain with the same URL over a fixed time period; eight minutes between each request. 
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infected host is able send requests and receive responses and download files, or it may be 
a form of a configuration file download for Dorkbot. 
 
Further throughout the execution lifecycle of the malware, domain d8 or d9 may 
be queried. It was observed in the testing lab that one host requested domain d8 and 
another infected host queried domain d9. Upon successful query response, a TCP session 
is established over port 1942 to constitute an HTTP POST request. This is valid for both 
observed infected hosts. Below is an example malware process running on an infected 
client revealing the parameters used to run the binary generating the POST requests. 
 
The command line arguments of the “bitcoin-miner.exe” are described as follows: 
(-a): to specify the hashing algorithm or the time in seconds between each Getwork 
request, in this case 60 seconds, (-l): allows enabling or disabling Long-Polling, in this 
case it is disabled, and (-o): specifies the URL to which the miner will connect to. 
Examining the associated HTTP traffic, exposes Bitcoin mining signature through the 
Getwork Method and its X-Minining-Extensions (Bitcoin, 2013).  It is important to note 
that bitcoin mining is a process-intensive task which involves hashing and validating a 
256 padded hexadecimal string in little-endian order with SHA256.  Discussing the 
Bitcoin protocol and the factors involved in details is out of the scope of this paper and 
the focus is driven on examining the HTTP traffic generated by the malware. 
According to the specification, a miner requests a new block header to hash or 
solve through the Getwork method (Getwork has been superseded with the 
Getblocktemplate method). Getwork is a JSON-RPC method over HTTP that when called 
with no parameters, allows a miner – the infected host in this case – to get new work to 
solve. In order to fulfill the new mining job, the method request should be sent with an X-
Mining-Extensions header (to an extent, similar to an HTTP header) specifying the 
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the User-Agent type in the HTTP header. The below two captures illustrate the mining 
extensions and the User-Agent used in both requests to d8 and d9. 
!
!
Although the POST requests in both cases are alike, the backend implementation 
of both requested servers may be different. This is evident in the responses generated by 
each POST request. For example, A POST request made to d8 generated the below 
response. 
 
From the response above, the mining work is done through a mining pool 
(50BTC). A mining pool consists of a group of miners unifying their mining resources to 
solve the same mining problem. This technique can increases the probability of solving 
the problem within time periods less than an individual would. In this case, bitcoins 
gained from solving the problem are distributed among the miners within that specific 
mining pool. The mining pool is specified through the X-Long-Pooling header; which An Early Malware Detection, Correlation, and Incident Response System with Case Studies! 24 
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allows specifying a URI and ports different than the original connection. The X-
Blocknum header specifies the block number that is currently being worked on. This 
header is utilized when mining pools are used and is not provided when using a local 
bitcoin instance (bitcoind). The X-Roll-NTime header specifies the number of seconds 
that the mining server is willing to accept block headers for. Combined with long 
pooling, the mining server can determine how old a block header it can accept. 
The second response for the request made to d9 is quite different. Notably, the 
inclusion of the X-Stratum header.  
 
This header contains a URI pointing to the server’s Stratum interface. This 
instructs the mining client to switch to the URI specified in the X-Stratum header. The 
value of “stratum+tcp” indicates that the communication is over TCP. 
It is worth noting that both POST requests acted as gateways to mining servers to 
do the actual work instead of conducting the mining individually, increasing the chances 
of successful bitcoin mining, and hence better bitcoin profitability. Also, the credentials 
used in both POST requests were different and were sent unencrypted.  
3.1.4.  Dorkbot Variant Objectives 
By now, the objectives of this Dorkbot variant may be anticipated. Through its 
infection techniques (CTS and STC), ultimately, the malware guarantees a maximum 
infection rate, especially if the malware is not responded to and eradicated within 
appropriate time frames. The more hosts are infected, the higher the number of miners is 
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3.1.5.  Infection Containment and Eradication 
Upon the initial symptoms of the infection were discovered, a sample of the 
malware executable was preserved for analysis in a testing environment. This was crucial 
for the analysis phase of the malware, mainly, for two reasons; 1) there were no IDS rules 
designed specifically to trigger on the malicious network activities from the identified 
host, and 2) at the time, the deployed antivirus product had no signatures nor heuristic 
detection techniques to flag and quarantine this particular variant of Dorkbot. However, 
once the malware was executed, its network activities, such as DNS and HTTP requests 
were identified and recorded. This information led to the creation of new sixteen Snort 
(Sourcefire, 2001) IDS signatures (VRT 2013, April 16) to detect the network presence 
of the malware. The signatures then were pushed into the IDS. The signatures covered 
both, the C&C and CTS/STC network activities. In this case, any infected client 
performing the C&C but not accessing any shared media is detected, and any infected 
client attempting to access the shared media is also detected. This step is necessary to 
prevent an infected client continuously propagating the malware to the server, hence, no 
new clients will be infected by the server. The malware interactions with the test host 
were also observed and recorded. 
The malware knowledge records were then created and stored into the malware 
knowledgebase in relation to the newly created IDS signatures. The records contained the 
malware IoC’s such as the malware directory, malware naming convention, and registry 
keys added by the malware. The records also contained a list of the tools that were tested 
to perform as required to disinfect a detected host. A minified malware knowledgebase 
record can be similar to the one depicted in Figure 9. 
This way other IT teams such as the helpdesk can be early and smoothly engaged 
into a scaled out incident response plan due the methods the malware uses for 
propagation. It is worth noting that at the time of infection, there was no sufficient online 
information available on this Dorkbot variant. Multiple freely available tools were tested 
for detecting this variant. Six hours from the infection, the first reports of this variant 
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Figure 9. Sample malware knowledgebase record. 
Once all of the information is stored, a host detected exhibiting either the C&C or 
CTS/STC network activity resulted in the automated and dynamic response action of 
moving the host to the quarantine VLAN, further preventing any type of network activity 
to the C&C and IRC servers, or infecting the file server with the malware executable, 
thus, preventing new clients from being infected. Owners of the quarantined hosts were 
presented with a captive portal explaining the reason of the quarantine and the steps 
forward to disinfect the machine and move back to their normal state. In the case of 
infections originating from VPN addresses, an existing Snort (Sourcefire, 2001) IPS – 
inline – configured in Drop mode on the LAN side was updated with the same signatures 
created during the analysis of the malware. This prevented any CTS infections and the 
associated DNS queries from hosts connecting to the enterprise through VPN. . 
Due to placing the system into action, any infected host connecting to the network 
was identified and automatically reacted upon by moving it to the quarantine VLAN. As 
soon as the notification of Dorkbot infection is received, the eradications tools were 
pushed and ran on the infected client through the enterprise client management software. 
Human interaction with the infected hosts was minimal and only for confirming that the 
host was properly disinfected. Eradication on the server side was semi-automated. A 
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reverse its actions by modifying folder attributes back to their original state. All of this 
resulted in minimizing the number of infected hosts, hence, leading to reverting 
production systems and the infected hosts to their normal operational mode within less 
than twelve hours of the initial identification of the infection. This included over 35 
infected hosts and one server. Although there will always be costs involved in 
disinfecting clients, however, the Recovery Time Objective (RTO) in this case could 
have been lowered or even eliminated – from a server perspective – if existing IDS and 
antivirus signatures were in place. If such signatures existed, the malware may have 
never propagated to the server, hence, it would not act as the malware incubator infecting 
connecting clients. 
3.2.  Steckt and Neeris Worms/IRCbots 
3.2.1.  The Entry Point 
An odd and inactive binary with the name “boom.exe” was discovered on a host 
with no signs of potential malware infection. The binary was preserved for analysis to 
determine its state. When executed in a test environment (physical/virtual), its process 
runs for a minute and then terminates with no noticeable behaviors or interactions. A 
memory dump of the process was captured using ProcessExplorer (Russinovich & 
Cogswell, 2013). The dump contained text usually seen in phishing and scam attempts. 
At minimum, three different languages where observed as shown in Table 2. The 
translation among the languages is interchangeable except for the Arabic/English text. In 
the context of the Arabic language, the repetitive usage “Allah Allah” may be interpreted 
as a sign of admiration, which aligns with the context of “you look beautiful here”. Terms 
“selam” and “marhaba” are usually used for greetings. 
Spanish  Arabic/English  English 
     
Table 2. Sample of spam-like strings found in "boom.exe" memory dump. 
References to Skype and another chat application known as “digsby” were identified in 
the dump. Emoticons used in chat apps were also observed. For example, in Skype the 
text “(sun)” is interpreted as a sun icon to both ends of the chat session.  An Early Malware Detection, Correlation, and Incident Response System with Case Studies! 28 
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Most importantly, a suspicious shortened URL was observed, as shown in the 
memory dump above. This combination shares resemblance with the Dorkbot variant 
suspected initial distribution method discussed in Section 3.1; unsolicited Skype 
messages. Based on the findings, an assumption of process injection was considered; 
where the binary would inject the text identified earlier along with the shortened URL 
into a Skype chat session. In order to test the suggested injection behavior, a Skype chat 
session was setup while the binary is being executed. However, the binary process kept 
terminating with no observed suspicious behaviors. As a result, the shortened URL was 
visited through a web browser to land on a 4shared – cloud storage service – web page.  
The web page hosted a downloadable file with the name “hotimg.facebook.pif”. 
 
A simple test environment consisting of two hosts connected to a SOHO router 
was setup. One of the hosts is running Windows – with ProcessExplorer (Russinovich, 
2013) and Fiddler (Telerik, 2013) – to execute the malware on, the second host is a Linux 
running Wireshark (Wireshark, 2013) and tcpdump (tcpdump, 2013) for capturing traffic. 
The SOHO router runs the custom firmware DD-WRT (DD-WRT, 2005) to facilitate 
traffic mirroring through IPTables (Netfilter, 1999) to the Linux host. Eventually, the 
SOHO router is connected to the Internet gateway to facilitate Internet access. The binary 
was downloaded and executed to record its network activities.  
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3.2.2.  Chains of Execution and Infection Map 
Due to the number of interrelated activities, the flow has been broken into three 
infection stages. Table 3 summarizes the domains/IP addresses used in relation to each 
stage. Figure 10 illustrates the infection execution map and the suggested stages.  
Sym.  Domain/IP Address  Protocol  Port  Stage 
d0  4shared.com  TCP/HTTP  80  1, 2 
d1  h1479562.stratoserver.net  TCP/IRC  5050  1,3 
d2  divshare.com  TCP/HTTP  80  2, 3 
d3  st4.divshare.com  TCP/HTTP  80  2, 3 
d4  topcongo.be  TCP/HTTP  80  3 
d5  team.immsky.de  TCP/IRC  81  3 
d7  app2.divshare.com  TCP/HTTP  80  3 
d8  .static.steadfastdns.net  DNS/PTR  53  3 
d9  f.eastmoon.pl  TCP/IRC  9000  3 
d10  wifi-usbx.me  DNS  53  3 
d11  h1604802.stratoserver.net  TCP/RELOAD  1986  3 
IP1, IP2, IP3  87.106.83.47,  217.160.123.192, 37.123.118.4  TCP/RELOAD  1986  3 
Table 3. Summary Steckt and Neeris worms/IRCbots domains and IP addresses used during C&C. 
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   Stage 1 – is initiated with resolving the shortened URL extracted from the binary 
“boom.exe” memory dump.  As discussed in Section 3.2.1, the final destination of this 
URL is the cloud storage service; 4shared. The hosted binary “hotimg.facebook.pif” was 
downloaded. Upon execution, an alias process with the name “adobereader.exe” was 
spawned. Following the execution, A DNS response to the domain 
“h1479562.startoserver.net” was returned with a resource record of “85.214.137.233”. 
The infected host then established a session to join the IRC channel “#biz abc” over TCP 
port 5050. 
The user mode (-ix) observed denotes that 1) the host (nickname) state within the 
channel should be visible through the “-i” (Kalt (A), 2000), and 2) the hostname or IP 
address of the particular nickname should be unhidden/unmasked through the “-x”.  The 
user mode (x) may be implementation specific. 
  Eventually, the infected host connected to the Internet Relay Network 
“irc.priv8net7.com”. As a side note, later in Stage 3 the IP address 85.214.137.233 is also 
returned as a resource record for a different domain; “team.immsky.de”. Although, no 
connections were established to that same IP address in that case, however, the same 
Internet Relay Network “irc.priv8.net7.com” is joined. 
 
 An Early Malware Detection, Correlation, and Incident Response System with Case Studies! 31 
!
Yaser!Mansour,!ymansour@outlook.com! ! !
Generally, this is dependent the nature of an IRC network; a group of IRC servers 
connected to each other (Kalt (B), 2000), Figure 11 (!). However, there are cases where 
the implementation of such an architecture may be different. The variations of interest in 
the context of this discussion are IRC bouncers, and IRC daemons.  
An IRC bouncer, Figure 11 (") – BNC for short – can be thought of as a hosted 
software component implemented to act as an IRC proxy server between a client and the 
final IRC server. In this case, the BNC is capable of a) relaying the IRC traffic between 
the client and the IRC server, and b) hide the connection details (hostname or IP address) 
of the other end of the IRC session. The use of BNCs – sometimes referred to as stepping 
stones – has been discussed in (Ramsbrock, Wang & Jiang, 2008) and (Goel, Feng, Feng 
& Maier., 2007). In fact, several open-source IRC bouncers are available, such as ZNC 
and psyBNC. On the other hand, an IRC daemon (IRCd) is the software implementation 
of the server side of the IRC protocol, Figure 11 (#). IRCd servers are mostly built to 
host private IRC chat services. However, an IRCd server may also be linked to an 
existing IRC network, for example, EU-EFnet. 
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Figure 11. Simplified projections of IRC networks/potential variations mapped against observed domains. 
One of the major challenges encountered during the analysis of IRC traffic is the 
implementation-specific features of an IRC network, server, or even client. The issue 
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Table 4 summarizes the activities observed during Stage 1. The Source and Alias 
columns refer to the origin of the activity, C&C refers to the contacted domain/IP 
address, Protocol and Port illustrate the Protocol and the Port used by the origin, and the 
Purpose refers to the action/purpose of the observed network activity. 
Source  Alias (if any)  C&C  Protocol  Port  Purpose 
boom.exe  boom.exe  4shared.com  TCP/HTTP  80  Download binary  
hotimg.facebook,pif  adobereader.exe  h1479562.stratoserver.net 
/85.214.137.233 
TCP/IRC  5050  Join IRC #biz abc 
Table 4. Summary of the activities observed during Stage 1. 
Stage 2 – After the IRC channel “#biz abc” has been joined in Stage 1, several 
URLs were pushed to the infected host. This denotes the beginning of Stage 2. 
 
The first URL points to a binary file with the name “joke” hosted on a cloud 
storage service; divshare.com. The three remaining shortened URLs resolve to a single 
“Script” or “screensaver” file of name “foto.scr” which is hosted at the cloud storage 
service 4shared. 
hxxp://www.4shared.com/download/Hq2h11JE/foto 
Immediately after, a DNS response to the domain “diveshare.com” was received.  
This was followed by an HTTP request to download the binary “joke”. It is worth noting 
that the domain “4shared.com” was not queried, hence, the file “foto.scr” was not 
downloaded. Also, the HTTP response from the server returned HTTP status 302 and had 
the Location HTTP header present. This resulted in requesting the file download from a 
subdomain of “diveshare.com”; in this case “st4.divshare.com”, to fetch the file, 
however, the URL pattern is different. The second response also returned status 302 
resulting in the redirection to another HTTP request with yet a different URL pattern. 
This redirection behavior may have been implemented in an attempt to avoid detection by 
jumping from one park to another until the final park containing the malicious file is 
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At this point, the binary “joke” has been downloaded to the local disk and has the 
following information  
 
Although the file “foto.scr” was not downloaded automatically, the file was 
manually downloaded through the browser for later inspection. The file “foto.scr” has the 
following information. 
 
Following the download of the “joke” file, several private messages – denoted as 
PRIVMSG – from the infected host to the IRC channel “#spread” were observed. The 
purpose of this channel is unclear as it has never been joined by the infected host. 
However, the messages exchanged indicate a reporting mechanism of the state of the 
execution back to the attacker, for example, the message “created proc:” and the PID 
value of the executable. This behavior is evident in all download/execution attempts. 
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As noted in the capture above, the binary “joke” was executed with an alias of 
“google_32404.exe”. Pivoting into its memory dump reveals the below shortened URLs. 
 
These shortened URLs follow the same pattern of the ones pushed through the 
IRC channel “#biz abc” as discussed at the beginning of Stage 2. Although they are 
different, they still point to the same 4shared URL hosting the “foto.scr” file.  
After that, the IRC channel “#biz abc” reported an error and the infected host 
exited the channel. Shortly later, the infected host rejoined the same channel and the same 
behavior as discussed at the beginning of Stage 2 was observed again. The only 
difference in this activity is the alias name “google_56383.exe” of the executed binary 
“joke”. The memory dump of this new alias contains the same shortened URLs found in 
the memory dump of the previous alias “google_32404.exe”. 
 
  At the time of the analysis, the execution of both binaries “google_32404.exe” 
and “google_56383.exe” did not yield any noticeable network activities. Given the URLs 
found in the memory dump, as well as the termination behavior after execution, it is 
believed that these binaries may act as injectors similar to the binary “boom.exe”. 
Table 5 summarizes the activities observed during stage 2. Activities that were manually 
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Source  Alias  C&C  Protocol  Port  Purpose 
IRC #biz abc  -  divshare.com/208.100.16.103  TCP/HTTP  80  Download/execute binary  
divshare.com  -  st4.divshare.com/208.100.16.112  TCP/HTTP  80  Download binary 
Table 5. Summary of the activities observed during Stage 2. 
Stage 3 – While the infected host was still joined to the IRC channel “#biz abc”, 
an IRC user (username) “java” from a different IRC channel/host “@jobs” changed the 
topic of the IRC channel “#biz”. This is denoted in the capture below with “java@jobs 
TOPIC #biz”. The TOPIC command/channel operation is used to view or change a 
channel’s topic (Kalt (A), 2000). In this case, the change includes a URL to download a 
binary file. The binary file name has been eradicated due to the inappropriate language 
used to name the binary file. 
 
As observed in Stage 2, the reporting mechanism through the IRC channel 
“#spread” is present. Although the binary file download was initiated as seen in the 
below capture, the execution of that binary failed (third PRIVMSG above). It is noted 
that the size of the download binary is 1KB (second PRIVMSG above) indicating an 
erroneous download. The reason for such an erroneous download is that the link on 
which the traffic was captured is censored and prohibits explicit content from being 
viewed/downloaded. Due to the inappropriate binary name, the file was considered as 
explicit material, hence, it was blocked from being correctly downloaded. 
 
In order to maintain the flow of events and continue the analysis, the binary file 
was manually downloaded and executed on the behalf of the username “java”. The file 
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Upon executing the binary “f***.exe”, it spawned over 470 processes with the 
name “flashapp.exe”. As a result, CPU utilization reached 100% and testing machine 
became irresponsive. 
 
The first network activity observed after execution is a DNS query to the domain 
“team.immsky.de”. The DNS response returned three resource records for the queried 
domain with a low TTL of 6 minutes for each resource record. 
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It is worth noting that the last resource record returned from the DNS response 
above has the same IP address of the domain “h1479562.stratoserver.net”. This is the 
same domain that was queried in Stage 1 to initiate the session to the IRC channel “#biz 
abc”. Following the DNS response, the infected host initiated a TCP IRC session over 
port 81 to IP address 98.158.179.127. The IRC session was initiated by setting a 
connection password through the PASS IRC command.  
!
In this particular instance, the PASS command was passed a file stored on the 
local disk at “C:\Users\Olympus\AppData\Local\Temp\” with the name “adobe2.tmp”. 
This file was dropped by the alias “flashapp.exe” and its contents are as follows 
 
The IRC session continued by joining the IRC channels “#n jobs”, “#test1”, and 
“#test2”. 
 
From the capture above, the channel “#test1” instructed a download of a binary 
file with the name “sp”. Channel “#test2” instructed a download of another binary file 
with the name “omg”. Finally, the username “h” from the two channels/hosts “#bossman” 
and “#jobs” – same channel as the username “java” – sends two private messages to the 
IRC channel “#n jobs” containing URL to a binary file with the name “trafic.exe”. As 
noted, the first two binaries are hosted at “divshare.com”, while the binary “trafic.exe” is 
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Earlier in Section 3.2.1, the resemblance observed to the Dorkbot variant was 
briefly discussed. The suspected resemblance was strongly tightened upon executing the 
binary file “sp”. The execution resulted in a DNS query to the domain “f.eastmoon.pl”; 
the same domain observed during the analysis of the Dorkbot variant at Section 3.1. 
Another evidence of resemblance is that the host running the “sp” binary attempts to join 
the IRC channel “#sp yap” over TCP port 9000 which has also been identified earlier in 
Section 3.1. However, the join failed since the IRC channel is sinkholed by CERT 
Polska. 
 
 
Later on, the IRC channel “#n jobs” reports an error and the infected host exists. 
Afterwards, the infected host rejoins the IRC channels “#n jobs”, “#test1”, “#test2”, in 
addition, channel “#test3”. The rejoins were accompanied with the same download URLs 
of binaries “sp”, “omg”, and “trafic.exe”. An Early Malware Detection, Correlation, and Incident Response System with Case Studies! 39 
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During the session, the use of the IRC channel mode (+o) was observed.  This 
mode is used to modify the assignment of channel operator “chanop” privileges (Kalt 
(A), 2000) over an IRC channel. The observed modifications involved assigning 
“chanop” privileges to the nickname/username “hh” on channels “#n jobs” and “#test 3”. 
 
At this point, three binaries are downloaded, namely, “sp” which behaves similar 
to the Dorkbot variant, “omg”, and “trafic.exe”. The binary file “omg” is discussed in 
Section 3.2.3.  
When the binary “trafic.exe” was executed, it spawned a child process with the 
name “sms.exe”. No network activities were observed while executing this binary. 
However, interactions with the host were observed. For instance, a subsequent execution 
of the NetSh command. Specifically, the below registry key was manipulated to add an 
entry for the “sms.exe” binary, enabling itself through the local firewall. 
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Another notable interaction is the modification of the startup page of at least 
Internet Explorer to point to the below URL.  
 
Basically, this URL acts as a redirector landing page. The redirection behavior 
observed during the analysis is depicted in Figure 11. 
http://fbdirecto.net/1/ http://goo.gl/G9QTq http://allstartpage.com
cybertech<article.com
topsearcharticle.info
OR
 
Figure 11. Observed fbdirecto.net redirection model. 
According to a Sucuri report (Sucuri, 2013), the website “hxxp://fbdirecto.net/1/” 
runs an outdated version of WordPress, and that the site exhibits suspicious conditional 
redirection behavior, which Sucuri refers to as “htaccess malware” (Dede, 2010). 
To recap the network activities observed so far, a summary table is provided 
below. After discussing the binaries “sp” and “trafic.exe”, Stage 3 concludes with the 
analysis of the remaining binary “omg”. 
Source  Alias  C&C  Protocol  Port  Purpose 
IRC java@jobs  
#biz abc  -  topcongo.be/213.186.33.19  TCP/HTTP  80  Download binary 
“f***.exe” 
f***.exe  flashapp.exe  team.immsky.de  DNS  53   
f***.exe  flashapp.exe  team.immsky.be/98.158.179.127  TCP/IRC  81  Join IRC #n jobs, 
#test1, #test2, #test3 
IRC #test1  - 
divshare.com, 
st4.divshare/208.100.16.103, 
208.100.16.112 
TCP/HTTP  80  Download binary 
“sp” 
IRC #test2  - 
divshare.com, 
st4.divshare/208.100.16.103, 
208.100.16.112 
TCP/HTTP  80  Download binary 
“omg” 
IRC PRIVMSG 
h@bossman #n, 
h@jobs #n 
-  topcongo.be/213.186.33.19  TCP/HTTP  80  Download binary 
“trafic.exe” 
IRC #test3  -  topcongo.be/213.186.33.19  TCP/HTTP  80  Download binary 
“trafic.exe” 
Binary sp  sp  f.eastmoon.pl  DNS  53   
Binary sp  sp  f.eastmoon.pl/148.81.111.111  TCP/IRC  9000  Join IRC #sp yap 
trafic.exe  sms.exe  -  -  -  - 
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3.2.3.  Malware and the abuse of the RELOAD Protocol 
The REsource LOcation And Discovery protocol is defined by the IETF (Jennings 
et al., 2013) as “a peer-to-peer (P2P) signaling protocol for use on the Internet.  A P2P 
signaling protocol provides its clients with an abstract storage and messaging service 
between a set of cooperating peers which form the overlay network.” 
It is out of scope to cover the finer details of the RELOAD protocol in this paper. 
Of specific interest to this case study, is the mechanisms used by the RELOAD protocol 
to achieve transport reliability. This is achieved through the use of Framing Headers 
(FH) within the Forwarding and Link Management Layer of the protocol, to wrap 
exchanged messages (FramedMessage). Thus, quick detection of link failures can be 
achieved.  A FramedMessage is defined in Figure 12 (Jennings et al., 2013). 
 
Figure 12.  FramedMessage definition in the RELOAD Protocol as defined in the standard. 
The Forwarding and Link Management Layer is responsible for maintaining 
connections and delivering messages among peers within the RELOAD overlay network. 
Depending on the value of the FramedMessageType, the fields in the PDU will be 
determined to indicate if the message is data or an acknowledgment. For example, if the 
PDU is of type “ack”, then the PDU is an acknowledgment and will contain the 
ack_sequence – the sequence number of the message being acknowledge – and    
received fields. 
  The introduction to the RELOAD protocol is necessary as it has been observed to 
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The binary file “omg” has at least two aliases when executed. Namely, 
“google081250.exe” and “mdm.exe”. 
 
For example, when the file “google081250.exe” was executed, it spawned an alias 
process with the name “mdm.exe”. In one instance, the DNS query to the domain “wifi-
usbx.me” returned five resource records with a TTL of 7 minutes and 29 seconds for each 
record. In a second instance, the execution of the same binary resulted in the same DNS 
query and resource records, however, the TTL is10 minutes for each record. 
 
Another DNS response of type PTR (domain pointer) to the domain 
“h11604802.stratoserver.net” and IP address of 85.214.127.253 was also observed.  
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Later in the capture, two consecutive TCP sessions over port 1986 were 
established between the infected host and IP addresses of 87.106.83.47, and 
85.214.127.253, respectively. It is worth noting that the IP address 87.106.83.47 does not 
associate with any resource record of the observed DNS responses. This may be 
indicative of a P2P session. After the 3-way handshake, several TCP packets with were 
exchanged. Most of these packets contained 15 bytes of payload, except for three packets 
with a payloads of 2, 5 and, 47 bytes respectively (excluding the acknowledgments). 
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10 
The last six packets exchanged (                  between the infected client and 
the server in the capture above are RELOAD Framing packets. In this context, a Framing 
Header and RELOAD Framing packet are used interchangeably.  
 
  Examining byte offset 0 of the payload of the first two RELOAD Framing packets 
( , ) reveals the value of 0x81 = 129 = FramedMessageType ack(129). 
FramedMessageType-=-ack(129)
 
The observed REALOD Framing packets are basically acknowledgements to 
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a message, it SHOULD immediately send an ACK message” (Jennings et al., 2013). This 
raised the possibility that the very first four TCP packets observed (          ) constitute 
the messages themselves being exchanged between the infected client and the server. 
Based on this, the payload of packets (      was examined. In this case, byte offset 0 of 
the payload of each packet (      contained the value of 0x80 = 128 = 
FramedMessageType data(128). 
FramedMessageType-=-data(128)
 
The same behavior was also observed in sessions to IP addresses 85.214.127.253, 
217.160.123.192, and 37.123.118.4. The last two IP addresses were also not associated 
with any DNS query or response. 
   
  The capture below examines the ack_sequence, received, and Acked Frames 
fields of an RELOAD Framing packet sent from the infected host (10.10.10.128). 
 
To recap, the ack_sequence holds the sequence number of the message being 
acknowledged. The sequence number in the capture above is either higher (server) or 
lower (infected client) than any of the sequence numbers of the actual TCP packets 
exchanged. This could be an indication that the wrapped sequence number(s) and 
acknowledgments may not belong to the same current session. Instead, they may belong 
to a different TCP session between two different peers within a RELAOD Overlay 
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addresses (but not the infected host) contained the same values of the ack_sequence, 
received, and Acked Frames. 
 
The observed network behavior, combined with the standard (Jennings et al., 
2013) description of a RELOAD Overlay Instance suggest that the infected host may 
have been joined to an existing overlay instance. In This case, the infected host would act 
as a peer, possibly routing messages to other peers (or infected hosts, for example, IP 
addresses 217.160.123.192, and 37.123.118.4). The RELOAD protocol may also have 
been used as a mechanism for C&C (for example, IP address 85.214.127.253). However, 
it is unclear how peers in an overly instance would negotiate Node-IDs and the overlay 
algorithm in use. Such negotiation was not observed during the capture.     
The malware also interacts with the host operating system. Similar to the 
“sms.exe” – discussed towards the end of Section 3.2.2 – the “mdm.exe” also modifies 
various registry keys, including the firewall, start page, and its persistence method (note 
the misspelling of the “firewall” word).  
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From the memory dump of the “mdm.exe” file, it appears that it also targets 
several social networks. References to Yahoo IM, Facebook, Google Talk, and ICQ were 
found in the memory dump. A sample of the memory dump shows the portion related to 
Facebook chat (note the Facebook’s CSRF/XSS tokens fb_dstg and post_form_id) 
 
Worms targeting Facebook are not new. In (Jean, 2010), several vulnerabilities in 
Facebook CSRF and XSS methods were identified by the author. In fact, exploiting these 
vulnerabilities was demonstrated by the author through the creation of worms that took 
advantage of such vulnerabilities to propagate through the social network. 
To conclude Stage 3, Table 7 summarizes the network activities observed. 
Source  Alias  C&C  Protocol  Port  Purpose 
omg  google081250.exe/mdm.exe  wifi-usbx.me  DNS  53   
omg  google081250.exe/mdm.exe  h1604802.stratoserver.net  DNS  53   
omg  google081250.exe/mdm.exe  h1604802.stratoserver.net/ 
85.214.127.253  TCP/RELOAD  1986   
omg  google081250.exe/mdm.exe 
87.106.83.47, 
217.160.123.192, 
37.123.118.4  
TCP/HTTP  1986   
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3.2.4.  Additional Observations  
Although the profiles hosting the malicious binaries on 4shared were not 
discussed, a number of observations are worth noting. For instance, one of the profiles 
does not only host the “hotimg.facebook.pif” file, but also hosts several copies of other 
malicious binaries, such as “instagram-album.exe” and “skypefbimg.pif”. At the time of 
writing, the profile was still serving these programs. Another observation is the number 
of profile views/downloads tracked by the 4shared website. Although these numbers may 
not reflect the actual number of infections, still, the numbers are alarming. 
 
 
Following the initial infection and the joining of the IRC channels, over 20 
executables were collected from the infected system. This includes executables 
downloaded through the IRC, manually downloaded, as well as the aliases created from 
executing the original malware files.  
3.3.  Case Studies Summary 
The analysis performed during the Dorkbot variant worm revealed the magnitude 
of the incident and its consequences. The extracted information regarding the worm’s 
infection and propagation techniques, as well as its objectives served as a repository for 
the response process. Firstly, the information facilitated the categorization of the worm’s 
network activities – IRC C&C, CTS and STC infection methods, and Bitcoin mining. 
This allowed the creation of sixteen new Snort (Sourcefire, 2001) IDS signatures (VRT 
2013, April 16) to detect every possibility of the worm’s existence on the network. 
Secondly, the integration of this new knowledge into the system allowed for minimizing 
the impact of the incident on business operations. Thirdly, the resulting information also 
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The activities analyzed from the Steckt/Neeris IRCbots case study provided a 
means of proactivity in defending the enterprise from future infections by these worms. 
Since the framework is already in place, the integration of the extracted knowledge into 
the system was rather seamless. This included the development of nine new Snort 
(Sourcefire, 2001) IDS signatures (VRT 2013, December 17) to trigger on the worms’ 
network activities. Although these infections were not detected on the enterprise network, 
the inclusion of the analyzed data provides the opportunity to anticipate and 
automatically react upon future infections. Thus, limiting the consequences resulting 
from these infections.  
4. Measuring Effectiveness 
4.1.  Solution vs. Problem Domain 
The system discussed in this paper is a response to the challenges presented in 
Section 2.  Provided with the case studies discussed in Section 3, how effective was the 
system in aligning its goals with regards to the problem domain and case studies?  
Consider the below interrelated and continuous manual processes, and the 
hypothetical but realistic time periods required to complete each process. These processes 
and their associated timings are used throughout the discussion of this section. 
Process 1: Alert (IP Address) $ Network Administration (separation of duties) 
$ IP to MAC to Port Verification (Switches) $  Authentication logs lookup (hostname) 
$  Match to end-user and location $ Host Isolation (if/when required) ~ 20 minutes. 
Process 2: Alert (message) $ Researching Online Resources $ Infection and 
Response Assessment $ Process 1 $ Assemble IoCs and Tools $ Contact User $ 
Disinfect Client ~ 45 minutes. 
Process 3: 0-day Infection (potential propagation) $ Initial Malware Analysis $ 
IDS Signatures Development and Integration $ Process 1 $ Assemble IoCs and Tools 
$ Contact User(s) ~ 2 hours. 
Challenge 1: Identifying outliers generating malicious network activities is 
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important and challenging when the environment is diverse and dynamic. Hypothetically, 
if 10 malware incidents in average are encountered per month, then conducting Process 1 
would cost 5 working days (assuming a working day is 8 hours) over a year. With the 
predefined and automated knowledge collection in place, this cost is eliminated for both, 
the networking and security teams. Also, the time required to initiate the response process 
is reduced 20 minutes per incident. The cost savings become more prominent in cases 
where 3 hosts are infected with 3 different malware within 1 hour. In the case of Dorkbot 
variant, the AHU identification was immediate as soon as the infected host connected to 
the network, yielding to seconds for conducting Process 1.  
Challenge 2/3: the prebuilt malware knowledgebase storing information 
prioritizing malware severity as well as prepares the analyst to understand and react to 
malware before they are even encountered. In the case of Dorkbot variant, the time spent 
conducting Process 2 yielded no actionable items at the time of the incident due to the 
lack of public information about the variant. This can be translated as losing 45 minutes 
in the infection and response lifecycle. Such lost time could have been utilized to prevent 
further propagation. Through Process 3 (and subsequently Process 1), the extracted 
knowledge was generalized and applied to all infected hosts automatically and 
dynamically. Another cost savings can be inferred in the case of the Steckt/Neeris worms. 
Since their knowledgebase records are already pre-built, the severity and response actions 
are predetermined. If a host is to be found infected with these worms, the knowledge and 
the following actions (i.e., isolation, eradication) are applied automatically.  
Challenge 4: Due to its dependency on solving Challenge 1/2/3, the time 
required to isolate an infected host can span to over 3 hours in a worst case scenario.  
This time period can be sufficient enough to allow the malware perform its damaging 
actions. For both case studies discussed, the dependents are already solved. Hence, the 
isolation can be effectively and automatically performed eliminating the costs associated 
with conducting the processes hierarchy from scratch. Eventually, the solutions to the 
previous challenges implicitly lead to solving the issues associated with Challenge 6. 
This is evident in the Dorkbot variant case. At the time of discovering the initial 
infection, no prior knowledge about the malware and its propagation capabilities was 
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system. This led to the automated identification and isolation of over 34 hosts as soon as 
they joined the network. This step was crucial to prevent further propagation of the 
malware to any production servers and contain the infection to clients only, without 
allowing clients to infect production servers. Otherwise, clients would constantly get 
infected (through STC) even if they have been disinfected earlier.  
Challenge 5: The summarized knowledge in the procedural notifications about 
infected hosts is tailored to accommodate the skills and functions of the helpdesk team. 
Thus reducing the time required to respond and troubleshoot end-users complaints related 
to suspicious computer behaviors. The ability to eradicate malware infections without 
necessarily having to re-image computers on per incident is considered one of the major 
advantages. This does not only impact helpdesk teams, but also end-users by eliminating 
almost 1 hour and a half of re-imaging time, thus, improving productivity for both. 
The proactivity enforced through the proposed system can help mitigate the 
consequences resulting from future malware infections. This is achieved through the 
well-informed, early response actions built-in within the system. Steckt/Neeris worms 
discussed in the second case study provide a good example. The extracted knowledge and 
developed signatures from the analysis were fed into the system to serve as an abstraction 
layer. This layer eliminates the costs associated with the response processes as if the 
malware was previously unknown. In this manner, all of the information required to 
detect, isolate, and eradicate future infections is already pre-built and ready to use. 
Combined with the automated and dynamic actions on detection, disruptions to business 
and operational continuity can be greatly minimized.  
4.2.  Additional Advantages 
One area where the proposed system can be utilized is Peer-to-Peer (P2P) usage 
tracking and actions. Although P2P networks have a history of hosting malicious 
contents, the emphasis here is on DMCAs; short for Digital Millennium Copyright Act.  
DMCAs can be financially destructive to an organization due lawsuits. Violations for 
downloading copyrighted material usually arrive long after the fact. This requires 
searching through and correlating a considerable number of historical logs, which can be 
difficult and extremely time consuming, guaranteed that older logs are retained for that An Early Malware Detection, Correlation, and Incident Response System with Case Studies! 51 
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particular time period. By correlating P2P alerts with the prebuilt contextual knowledge, 
one can keep track of P2P usage. In this case, not only the storage footprint will be lower 
since summarized logs may only be stored, but also will be easier and faster to search 
since it is already correlated. 
BYOD and mobile malware are two emerging areas attracting attention. Due to 
their ubiquitous nature, managing such devices is an ongoing effort which can be 
challenging. From a malware detection and response perspective, it is important to be 
able to identify devices infected with malware (including mobile malware) once they are 
on the enterprise network. Using the existing knowledge about users and mobile 
malware, device owners can be identified and actions based on the type of infection can 
also be automated. For example, an Android device infected with Plankton malware can 
be correlated with the owner’s network authentication and then the device can be 
automatically isolated to the quarantine VLAN. The same process discussed in this paper 
can be adapted to achieve the same response actions. Once isolated, the user is presented 
with the captive portal and the IT team is notified of the action. 
5. Future Work 
The system was designed to be modular and pluggable. In this manner, new 
modules or plugins can be added without major disruptions to the system’s workflow 
process. Another advantage is the ability to update a component (i.e., logging and 
correlation) of the system without affecting other components (i.e., detection). 
One of the major upgrades considered for the proposed system relates to the 
logging and correlation component. Specifically, the integration of Bro IDS logs and 
NetFlow data through SiLK. For example, when an infected host is detected, the system 
would automatically fetch Bro IDS logs (HTTP, DNS, SSL, etc.) and the SiLK NetFlow 
data for that particular host based on 1) predefined queries against the logs, and 2) a 
predefined, but updatable time threshold. The time threshold can be, for example, one 
minute worth of Bro and SiLK logs prior to and after the infection to limit the amount of 
returned information. The analyst may still need to access these logs manually for further An Early Malware Detection, Correlation, and Incident Response System with Case Studies! 52 
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investigating the incident, however, the knowledge added reinforces the analyst’s initial 
incident response decisions. 
A second future enhancement converges with the logging component and the 
investigative activities during response. This enhancement consists of developing a set of 
plugins that automate the ability to remotely execute scripts on an infected host to collect 
IoC information. For example, when an infected Windows host is detected, the logging 
component is triggered to automatically execute a PowerShell script against the infected 
machine. Such script can be tailored to obtain current running processes and their 
associated network information. Another script may be used to dump the current state of 
registry hives after the infection, and then compare these against a stored baseline registry 
hives. These add value to the forensics process once a host is detected and isolated. 
In certain cases, a specific malware may be well known and documented in terms 
of its behavior and eradication techniques. In such cases, remote and automated 
deployments of eradication tools may be feasible. This can be valuable in incidents where 
a considerable number of hosts are infected with a self-propagating malware. Take for 
example the Dorkbot variant discussed in this paper. A single infection was sufficient 
enough to understand the malware behavior and its eradication tools. Thus, the 
knowledge extracted from this particular incident can be safely generalized to the other 
hosts exhibiting the same Dorkbot variant behavior. This should allow for the rapid 
deployment of the tool(s) identified in the malware knowledgebase automatically. 
6. Conclusion 
Most new malware specimens discovered are more sophisticated and complex 
than their predecessors. Such complexity not only applies to the obfuscation and anti-
evasion techniques built-in, but also applies to the economics and purposes driving their 
distribution. This growth in complexity has proven to be capable of hindering the CIA 
triad of an organization’s information security model. Notably, the malware specimens 
analyzed in this work share common characteristics, though, they are independently 
different and were encountered at different time frames. Namely, characteristics such as 
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binaries, and 2) utilization of IRC as a mechanism for C&C communication. The 
adoption of such techniques can be regarded to attempts to thwart detection and blocking 
of suspicious domains and IP addresses used by the malware, and at the same, provide 
easiness in controlling infected bots. The abuse of the RELOAD protocol to potentially 
build a P2P botnet, as well as a mechanism for C&C communication is another example 
of elevating the complexity level to evade detection. 
The realization of complex malware has led to the development of proactive and 
defensive measures to streamline such complexity. However, the absence of predefined 
and ready-to-use contextual knowledge about the monitored network and malware 
behaviors can be problematic. The inability to immediately make informed response 
decisions to malware infections can obstruct the response process as a whole, hence, 
negatively impacting individuals and business operations alike. 
The framework discussed in this paper realizes the involved complexity and its 
consequences. In particular, the complexity layer added by the malware specimens 
analyzed during the study has been dissected. Leading to the development and publishing 
of a total of 25 new Snort IDS signatures covering both cases studies. Such task acts as 
the stimulus enabling the various components of the framework to mutually contribute 
into minimizing the time and steps required between detection and response to malware 
incidents. This minimization is further enforced through the automation of response 
actions built on top of the pre-correlated knowledge. As such, incidents can be 
dynamically addressed as early as detection, regardless of the nature of the monitored 
network. In addition, the summarized procedural guidance provided upon detection 
facilitates smooth incident response progression among response teams. Such proactive 
implementation has proven to be advantageous in malware propagating incidents, as well 
as in preparedness for future infection incidents. Ultimately leading to not only reduced 
response times, but also minimized risks of disrupting operations, hence, positively 
impacting individuals and business continuity. An Early Malware Detection, Correlation, and Incident Response System with Case Studies! 54 
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